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WASHINGTON - October 31 - The upcoming meetings between President Bushs and Vladimir Putin in
Washington and Texas November 12 - 14 have put the ABM Treaty and national
missile defense back on the agenda after nearly two months in which
terrorism drowned out all other issues. Decisions are likely to be made
soon that will have a major impact on the progress of the missile defense
program, the health of arms control efforts and the cohesion of the
international coalition against terrorism.
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The U.S.-Russian minuet begins in Genoa
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At their July 22 summit meeting in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush and Putin
began a slow minuet in which they formally linked missile defenses with
reductions in nuclear weapons. There has been background music but little
progress since, in part because the U.S. has yet to complete an on-going
review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and has not been prepared to propose
specific levels of strategic nuclear weapons.
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What happened in Shanghai
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When they came together again in Shanghai in mid-October, Bush and Putin
reported progress toward agreement on both missile defense and nuclear
reductions. President Bush said at his October 21 press conference with
President Putin: We also see progress in our efforts to build a new
strategic framework. President Putin agreed: I believe we do have an
understanding we can reach agreements.
However, the two leaders continued to display major notes of discord. Bush
warned: The events of September 11 make it clearer than ever that a cold
war ABM Treaty that prevents us from defending our people is outdated, and
I believe dangerous. By contrast, Putin called the ABM Treaty an
important element for stability in the world, and saw no connection
between missile defense and September 11. It would be difficult for me to
agree that some terrorists will be able to capture intercontinental
ballistic missiles and will be able to use them, Putin said.
The summit was also significant for steps not taken. Some in the
administration were pushing President Bush to set a deadline for an
agreement and to stipulate that, if none were reached, the U.S. would give
six months notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as provided for in the
Treaty. There were hints that a deadline was written into President Bushs
talking points for the meeting. However, Secretary of State Colin Powell
said at an October 21 press briefing, We did not give formal or informal
notification of an intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. He added: The only talking points that count were the ones that came out of the
President last night.
There were also reports that the U.S. would propose a new lower limit on
strategic nuclear warheads, probably not as low as Russias suggested level
of 1,500, but perhaps closer to 2,500. Instead Bush said at his press
conference: I told Mr. Putin that we are in the process of analyzing our
nuclear arsenal, and National Security Adviser Condelzza Rice added that the President said that he would be getting back to President Putin soon
on a number.
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The next steps
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Another overture was heard from the Bush side on October 25. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Pentagon was delaying some
missile defense tests that would bump up against the ABM Treaty. This
raised hopes that the two sides were moving closer to a deal. U.S.
Ambassador to Russia Sandy Vershbow said on October 26, I am more
confident that we will find a mutually advantageous solution to the problem
of missile defense because we now have a stronger commitment to meeting new
threats together.
An agreement could be concluded when Putin meets Bush November 12 - 14 in
Washington, D.C. and Crawford, Texas. However, it will be difficult to
complete the technical aspects of the accord in the next two weeks. (The
New York Times reported, however, that President Bush had a session on
October 24 with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the size and composition of
the U.S. arsenal of nuclear weapons.)
What would a deal look like? An agreement from the U.S. point of view would
allow the United States to conduct a planned series of tests in coming
years and construct new missile defense facilities in Alaska beginning next
year. While Russian officials have indicated they will not abandon the ABM
treaty, even by mutual agreement, Russia seems to be moving toward an deal
that permits more extensive U.S. testing and construction in Alaska that
heretofore might have been considered in violation of the Treaty. The
Russians appear ready to accept any level of U.S. testing, but are
insisting that an amended treaty remain in force and they are drawing the
line at the moment at deployment, an issue to be wrestled with later.
In addition, any deal would also have to be accompanied by deep U.S. cuts
in nuclear weapons.
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ABM Treaty dissonance
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Last July 17, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed
Services Committee about three near-term missile defense activities that
could violate the ABM Treaty. For the moment, two of those activities have
been placed on hold. (The third is not scheduled until next year.)
Secretary Rumsfeld announced the delay: On October 24th, an Aegis Radar on
a surface ship was scheduled to track a strategic ballistic-missile test
target, which it did not do. In a separate operation, the Aegis Radar was
to have tracked a Titan II space-launch vehicle scheduled for launch
November 14th. During the October 24th test, the Aegis Radar was scheduled
to have tracked the defensive interceptor; and during the same test, the
multiple-object tracking radar at Vandenberg was to have tracked the
strategic ballistic missile target. Rumsfelds announcement could be
viewed as positive signal to the Russians and the rest of the world that
the United States would not violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. However, it is also true that the tests were delayed for technical
reasons unrelated to the ABM Treaty.
More to the point, the tests cited by Rumsfeld are not crucial to
development of missile defense at this stage. Philip Coyle, a former
director of testing and evaluation at the Pentagon, called the tests
involving the Aegis radar a red herring because they would violate the
treaty but are not particularly significant. That's an example of one of
the tests that they'd like to do that would bump up against the ABM
treaty. They picked a test that ... doesn't help that much with the
overall development of the program, Coyle said at a press briefing last
month.
Coyle has concluded that there is no urgent need to abrogate the treaty
now. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee last summer,
he said, The treaty is not now an obstacle to proper development and
testing of a national missile defense system. Operational testing would
likely require modifications to the ABM Treaty, Coyle said. But there is
plenty of time to consider this, as such real-world testing is many years
away.
The Administration also has said it needs to move beyond the ABM treaty
because its plans for a new missile defense testing facility in Alaska
would violate it. But analysis by Coyle and others has shown that the
Alaska sites value as a testing facility is also questionable. It appears
that the Administrations real intent is to construct a rudimentary
deployment site to be ready by 2004. Two considerations suggest that such
a deployment would have little value except to fulfill a Bush campaign
pledge to deploy a national missile defense before the end of his first
term. First, the current mid-course ground based system will not be
adequately tested by 2004. Second, the current configuration of radars will
limit the ability of the site to defend against attacks from North Korea,
the rogue state so often cited as the ballistic missile threat.
Lawrence Korb, an assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan
Administration, said: The nightmare of the Republicans is that during this
administration this program remains in R&D as you do all of the tests...
They
feel that if in fact Bush doesn't get re-elected, which is at least a
reasonable possibility, they will not be able to deploy something. So
therefore, the rush is to break the ABM Treaty and deploy something before
2004. That's why we want to clear the brush at [the new testing facility
at] Fort Greely, Alaska: so there is no turning back.
The Pentagon has begun clearing the Fort Greely site. Administration
officials have suggested that if no agreement is reached with Russia in the
next months, the administration may be prepared to give six months notice
of withdrawal in January 2002. That announcement could clear the way to
begin construction the so-called pouring of concrete by the summer of
2002.
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Senators remained concerned
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While Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin shelved several
Senate Armed Services Committee decisions that could have constricted the
Administrations missile defense program, he continues to argue against any
unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
On October 22, in a speech delivered in Washington, Levin continued to
press his case against unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty: The Bush
administration has got to be very careful before they do it, because if we
withdraw unilaterally, there will be more nuclear material on Russian soil,
not less. That adds to the proliferation threat, which is the greatest
threat we face, because there is nothing more threatening than a terrorist
or a terrorist state getting their hands on nuclear material. And the more
nuclear material there is on Russian soil, the greater the likelihood is
that there could be theft or pilferage of some of that material getting
into the hands of a terrorist.
After Rumsfelds October 25th announcement, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Joe Biden declared: I'm happy they restrained. I don't
think they would have restrained three months ago if they got to this
point. . . . They are restraining now apparently because the president is
in negotiations and doesn't want to, I assume, act unilaterally here.
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ABM Finale?
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The Putin-Bush meetings in November will be pivotal for the future of
national missile defense and arms control. The most desirable outcome is
one that results in significant reductions in both nations nuclear
arsenals and leaves the ABM Treaty intact. The least desirable would be a
U.S. decision to give notice that it was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty
with none or only modest cuts in nuclear weapons. The best guess is that
the results will be somewhere in between some agreed modifications to the
limits set by the ABM Treaty on missile defense testing, accompanied by
cuts in offensive weapons.
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