A recent U.S.-India nuclear
agreement was so hastily concluded the Bush administration is
only now beginning to figure out how to implement it in the
face of tough questions from the U.S. Congress and
nonproliferation experts.
The agreement, announced July 18 after Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh met President Bush at the White House,
upends decades-old nonproliferation rules and will require
changes in U.S. law and international policy.

The administration lowered the bar too far.
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Robert Einhorn, former State Department nonproliferation official
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U.S. officials are optimistic the Republican-controlled
Congress will approve steps to fulfill Bush's promise to sell
civilian nuclear technology to India.
Such sales are now prohibited under U.S. law because India
refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT,
and is producing nuclear weapons banned by the pact and other
agreements.
With the new deal, the United States in effect accepts
India as a nuclear-weapon state.
U.S. and Indian officials had aimed to conclude an
agreement before Bush makes an expected trip to India in early
2006. But the atmosphere seemed ripe while Singh was in
Washington, so U.S. and Indian negotiators worked
around-the-clock to seal a deal.
Early grumblings among lawmakers and experts who believe
the accord weakens nuclear-weapons controls suggest Bush could
face a battle to amend or waive U.S. law. Congressional sources
say a growing Indian-American community will be a factor in
supporting the accord.
So far, "the administration has no clear plan" to implement
the agreement, said a Republican participant in a recent
briefing for congressional staff. The participant said
officials had "no good answers" on how the deal would affect
international security.
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
U.S. officials involved in the deal acknowledged there were
many unanswered questions about implementing it. These include
how long it would take for India to separate its civilian and
military nuclear programs, so the civilian side could be put
under international monitoring.
Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns plans to visit
India in September and it is hoped those talks will yield
answers, a senior official told Reuters.
Administration and congressional aides spoke on condition
of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the deal.
Some experts worry Bush will press Congress to act before
India fulfills promises to adhere to international standards to
stem the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles.
The senior official said the administration would not
propose legislation for at least a month or two and would await
Indian action to meet new nonproliferation commitments.
"It will take months for the Indians to begin (to meet)
some of their commitments and to complete others," the official
said. "The Indians know we're going to wait and see all this
occur."
He said once the process was underway, the administration
would ask Congress and member nations of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, which seeks to control nuclear-technology exports, to
modify laws and policy.
EMBRACE
After India tested nuclear weapons in 1998, Washington led
international condemnation. But Bush has accelerated an embrace
of the world's largest democracy.
His aides say India shares U.S. values, does not transfer
nuclear technology to troublesome entities and desperately
needs to expand its energy sources.
Many officials also see India as a counterweight to China,
and view the deal as an opportunity to revive a shaky U.S.
nuclear industry.
Robert Einhorn, formerly the State Department's top
nonproliferation official, said the strategic case for
strengthening U.S.-India relations has broad support.
But the nuclear agreement is a setback for nonproliferation
and will make it harder to advocate stricter rules for Iran and
North Korea, Einhorn told an American Enterprise Institute
program.
"The administration lowered the bar too far," he said.
He said India, unlike the five nuclear-weapons states
recognized under the NPT -- the United States, Britain, France,
China and Russia -- is still producing weapons-grade plutonium
and should be encouraged to stop, he said.