If you read only the headlines from Operation Enduring Freedom, you might imagine that the tactical brilliance displayed by air power in the past week is actually winning the war on terrorism. The news stories project an image of mass and consequence, and the always- impressive gun camera videos and satellite photographs being released by the Pentagon suggest decimation from the air.

But the images are completely at odds with the actual air campaign that has unfolded since Oct. 7. Not only is the effort sparse to the extreme, but the operation displays conventional wisdom and chronic hesitations that are driving air power insiders to bewilderment and depression.

"I'm extremely pessimistic with the lack of imagination" being displayed in the first week of bombing, an Air Force general officer says. He admits that the security clampdown has closed off information even to the higher ranks in the Pentagon, and that covert and special operations accompanying the air attacks may indeed be having some impact. "If it's out there, they haven't shared it with little 'ole me," he says.

He points to the undeniable arithmetic of the endeavor and the modesty of the claims being made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard B. Myers. These are indicators that should tell the American people that any hope of quick victory is fanciful. Further, distorted reporting about the pace and scope of bombing signals dangerous messages to the Islamic world, and even to the Taliban, messages that will cause enormous additional problems in the future.

The math is most revealing. Despite reports and rumors coming out of Afghanistan about this and that being bombed, fewer than 50 distinct targets were struck in the first week. At the end of the week, only six or seven targets were being hit daily, this in a country the size of Texas. Lots of re-strikes of previously hit targets are included in each day's list.

Mostly because of the distances involved in flying to attack Afghan targets and then return, and because only 10 bombers and 15 fighters are being employed daily, in all attacks, fewer than 2,000 bombs and missiles have been fired in the campaign so far. In the first five days, Air Force heavy bombers delivered some 500 satellite-guided 2,000 lb. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAMs), 1,000 Mk82 dumb bombs, 50 CBU-87 cluster bombs, while B-2s delivered two bunker busting GBU-37s. Fifteen Navy fighters flying daily from carriers delivered some 240 JDAMs and laser-guided bombs, the latter including 1,000- and 2,000-pound versions, including a BLU-109 improved penetrating warhead version, the main "bunker buster" (but actually a fairly conventional hard target weapon). Another 50-60 Tomahawk cruise missiles have been fired.

The individual statistics are impressive: B-2 bombers flying from Missouri are carrying 16 JDAMs capable of being targeted on 16 dispersed aimpoints for each mission; B-1s are carrying 55 Mk82s and 24 JDAMs or 10 CBU-87s in adjoining bomb bays; B-52s are unloading 27 Mk82s and 12 JDAMs.

But how does any of this compare with previous air wars? In the Gulf War, the first day saw a total of 2,388 sorties and 812 strikes, with 150 cruise missiles being shot. First night targets alone numbered 144. In Yugoslavia, there were some 120 strikes flown on the first night, with around 100 cruise missiles fired. A total of 51 targets were on the first night list, as many as were hit in a week in Afghanistan.

Direct comparisons with the Gulf War and Yugoslavia, of course, are misleading, both in terms of aircraft and targets. The number of aircraft mobilized for Iraq was much larger than in Yugoslavia, and much larger than for Afghanistan. The Iraqi target base itself was three times the size of the Yugoslav one, and the Pentagon has constantly cautioned that there are few lucrative classical targets in Afghanistan. In Iraq, furthermore, there were few constraints on what could be bombed initially (constraints were introduced later). In Yugoslavia, leadership, urban, communications and electrical targets were restricted.

In his review of the first week, Rumsfeld says that bombing has "disrupted their communications somewhat… weakened the Taliban military, and damaged but certainly not eliminated their air defense capabilities." Gen. Myers adds that, "We have made a good first step in... destroying or damaging terrorist training camps."

Even when it comes to the tiny 1970's Taliban air force, Rumsfeld says, "it would be wrong to think that ... all of the aircraft from these films... have disappeared. They have not."

Disrupted. Weakened. Damaged. Those are carefully chosen words, dampening expectations of instant gratification. Neither Rumsfeld nor Myers provide historical examples to show how meager the effort is, though they have been saying since the beginning that a cruise missile or bomb won't win the war. U.S. and British spokesmen caution that the tempo of operations in the coming days will be "fluid."

"We are also, of course, very sensitive to the feelings of Moslem people around the world," British Under Secretary of State for Defence, Dr. Lewis Moonie, said Friday.

"Are we ever going to get it?" the Air Force general asks. There are actions of brilliance in the field, he says, and yet, the air campaign is trapped at the tactical level. Airmen are sent out everyday to hit a set of aim-points at targets, which they are doing superbly with no losses, but it is unclear what the connection is to the aims of the overall campaign, and indeed, hitting targets seems to be an aim in itself.

The messages conveyed are fourfold. First, though the conviction after Sept. 11 on the part of the American people was that they were willing to absorb U.S. casualties to fight this nasty war, the diffident unfolding suggests falsely that maybe that will not be necessary after all.

Second, by moving forward with excruciating deliberateness against a puny and non-threatening Taliban air and air defense force, a sense of weakness and unwillingness to take risk is communicated, both to the American people and the bad guys.

Third, by the Pentagon not being more explicit about the sparseness of the effort and the modesty of the target base, claims of civilian damage and of devastation wrought in Afghanistan resonate more, particularly in the Islamic world. Maps with fancy graphical symbols and gun camera video tapes are no longer sufficient -- there needs to be real data released every day: a list of targets, the number of weapons dropped, some historical analogy, U.S. estimates of civilian casualties.

Finally, there is also an enormous danger that exaggerated descriptions of ever increasing bombing intensity makes the Taliban and Al Qaeda believe that they are able to absorb the best that the U.S. military can throw at them, giving them greater confidence rather than make them feel that they are heading for disaster.

Every air war entails an enormous learning curve, as intelligence analysts gain a greater textured understanding of the target, as pilots learn the terrain, as new opportunities unfold and as the enemy reacts to destruction and pressure. No doubt that is happening in Afghanistan. Now it is time for the Pentagon and the administration to learn as well. They may be preparing the battlefield in Afghanistan for special forces and ground operations. But they are not doing a good job of preparing the rest the American people, the Taliban, or the world to understand what is happening and what is to be expected in the future.

William M. Arkin, the author of ten books and numerous studies on military affairs, is a consultant to numerous organizations, and a frequent television and radio commentator. He was an Army intelligence analyst during the 1970's, a nuclear weapons expert during the Cold War, and pioneered on-the-ground study of the effects of military operations in Iraq and Yugoslavia. In 1994, his "The U.S. Military Online: A Directory for Internet Access to the Department of Defense" was published. His Dot.Mil column, launched in November 1998, appears every other Monday on washingtonpost.com. E-mail Arkin at william.arkin@wpni.com.

###