Published on Friday, April 28, 2000 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
US Tells Russia:
Let's Keep Nukes Forever
by Stephen I. Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin
 
You would think that 10 years after the end of the Cold War, the United States would be doing everything it could to get Russia to reduce its bloated, aging, and dangerous arsenal of approximately 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

You would be wrong.

In fact, as revealed here for the first time, in documents obtained exclusively by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, U.S. negotiators have sought to allay Russian fears about a possible U.S. national missile defense (NMD) system by ruling out any future reductions in strategic nuclear warheads below the 1,500-2,000 level and encouraging Russia to maintain its nuclear forces on constant alert.

At the meeting earlier this year in Geneva where the documents below were presented to Russia, Russian negotiators countered with an offer to slash the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads held by each side (from the START II level of 3,000-3,500 to 1,500). The United States rejected the offer but provided no public justification for why it required more warheads.

That the United States is asking Russia to forsake deep reductions in nuclear weapons for the indefinite future is bad enough. This news is certain to anger many delegates to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference, currently taking place at the United Nations, who have been highly critical about the lack of progress in arms control and disarmament since 1995, when the United States renewed its promise under Article VI of the treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

Worse yet, the United States is encouraging Russia to continue to maintain its strategic nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert, ready to fire within minutes of receiving a launch order. As a consequence of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the continuing economic difficulties in Russia, Russia's early-warning network is a shambles. So many satellites and radars are inoperative or only partially functional that for as much as 12 hours a day, Russia has no means of detecting an ICBM launch from the United States. As for attacks from U.S. Trident submarines, each of which can carry up to 192 warheads, Russia essentially has no detection capability at all. Combining decaying and inoperative early warning systems with a "launch on warning" posture for thousands of nuclear weapons is a recipe for nuclear disaster.

Russia's continuous high-alert posture has already led to one major scare. On January 25, 1995, Russian radar technicians detected a routine scientific rocket launch from Norway but misinterpreted it as a Trident missile from a U.S. submarine. President Boris Yeltsin hurriedly convened a threat assessment conference with his senior advisers and for about eight minutes they deliberated whether to launch a counterattack before the incoming missile arrived. Fortunately, Russian military officers were able to determine--with only two or three minutes to spare--that the rocket was in fact heading away from Russian territory and therefore posed no threat.

Although the Clinton administration's rationale for a limited NMD system centers around "rogue states" like North Korea, only Russia has the capability today and into the indefinite future to deliver a significant number of extremely powerful nuclear weapons to targets in the United States in 30 minutes or less. While the risk of deliberate nuclear war is far lower than in years past, the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is rising, in no small part because of Russia's increasing reliance on nuclear weapons even as its early-warning systems (its eyes and ears) fall into disrepair.

But the Clinton administration has chosen to ignore this very real and growing danger and is instead expending significant time and political capital seeking to modify the ABM Treaty to allow the deployment of a not-yet-fully tested limited missile defense system against a threat which has yet to fully materialize. It is outrageous that the United States would not only pursue this path but actually exacerbate the danger by encouraging Russia to continue to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.

About the Documents

These documents were presented to Russian officials by U.S. negotiators during meetings in Geneva on January 19-21, 2000. John Holum, senior adviser for arms control and international security affairs at the State Department, headed the U.S. delegation. Yuri Kapralov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's arms control department, led the Russian delegation. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs translated the English-language documents into Russian. A trusted source recently obtained a copy of the translated documents and provided them to the Bulletin. The documents were subsequently translated back into English and have been reviewed by both Russian and English language speakers for accuracy.

The first three documents appear to be talking points for the U.S. delegation, most likely presented to the Russians by John Holum. The U.S. delegation also presented its Russian counterparts with a proposed protocol and annex to the ABM Treaty that would modify the treaty and allow the legal deployment of the first phase of the planned U.S. national missile defense system.

The documents discuss SHF (Super High Frequency ) radars, which are also known as X-band radars. Their frequency band is 3 to 30 gigahertz, which includes the X-band (8-12 gigahertz).

Table of Contents

NMD PROTOCOL: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

ANNEX ON VERIFICATION: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

RUSSIA'S CONCERNS

RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN PROPOSAL

UNILATERAL STATEMENT

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY

ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL

©2000 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

NMD PROTOCOL: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

  • President Clinton is counting on making the decision to deploy the national missile defense (NMD) system no earlier than mid-2000.

  • The US NMD system would not be directed against Russia and would not weaken Russia's strategic deterrent potential.

  • We recognize that this system contravenes the current provisions of the ABM Treaty.

  • We are ready to work with Russia to achieve confidence in the capabilities of a limited NMD system to counter extremist rogue states and to develop revisions to the ABM treaty.

  • You have our draft Protocol to the Treaty, which would permit the creation of a limited NMD system.

  • We have decided to present the Treaty amendments we propose in the form of a new "Protocol" prepared on the model of the 1974 Protocol. The Protocol would contain only those corrections to the Treaty that are necessary to permit the initial Phase I of the deployment of the limited NMD system. The rest of the Treaty would remain unchanged.

  • Allow me to present the provisions of our draft Protocol.

  • The preamble outlines the changes in the strategic situation and the necessity of adapting the Treaty to them to permit deployment of a limited national missile defense system and at the same time affirms our commitment to the Treaty. Specifically, the Preamble states that the limited NMD system "will neither threaten nor allow a threat to the strategic deterrent forces of either Party."

  • Article I specifies the deployment of the limited NMD system as an alternative to the deployment of ABM systems permitted under the current provisions of the ABM Treaty. Thus, the ban on the development of national missile defense systems and the ban on the development of the basis for such a system contained in Article I of the Treaty will not apply to the limited missile defense system.

  • Article II specifies that the development of this alternative system be permitted within the limits of one ABM system deployment region in which it deploys no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles with a radius of no more than 150 km--in full compliance with Article III of the Treaty.

  • Article II also specifies that existing long-range radar may be enabled for use as ABM radar to support this limited NMD system and that each Party may deploy one additional ABM radar each at any site within its national territory.

  • Article III specifies that if a limited NMD system is deployed in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, existing, operational ABM launchers deployed in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must be dismantled or destroyed; no dismantling or destruction of existing ABM radars is required. According to this provision, existing launchers deployed at Grand Forks which are not operational do not have to be dismantled.

  • Article IV contains a reference to the Annex, which is aimed at building confidence and assuring compliance with the Protocol and which is an integral part of the Protocol.

  • Later we will provide you with more detailed information about the Annex we have proposed.

  • Article V specifies that all rights and duties of the Parties stated in the Treaty shall remain in force with respect to the amendments introduced by the Protocol.

  • Article VI contains a requirement according to which, at the demand of one Party, the Parties shall begin further negotiations no sooner than March 1, 2001 to bring the Treaty into agreement with future changes in the strategic situation.

  • Article VII specifies that the Protocol shall enter into force after the exchange of ratification instruments, which shall take place after approval of the Protocol by the procedure called for by the constitution of each Party.

  • Finally, we would once again like to emphasize that the Protocol will contain only those amendments to the Treaty that are necessary to reflect the structure of the limited national missile defense.


    ANNEX ON VERIFICATION: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

  • As I already explained during our previous consultations, the US is ready to discuss several measures to build confidence and increase transparency, as well as to advance proposals aimed at strengthening verification under the Treaty with measures to be taken on the basis of mutuality and to promote additional confidence that none of the limitations specified in the amended ABM treaty is being violated.

  • Article IV of the proposed Protocol pertains to the Annex containing provisions on verification, the goal of which is to "build confidence and assure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty."

  • In our approach we have been guided insofar as possible by the goal of adapting certain fundamental aspects of inspection procedures specified in the START and other arms control agreements, keeping in mind the specific lessons we have learned from joint fulfillment of these treaties.

  • In developing specific monitoring measures, the USA has tried to achieve a balance between the necessary operational burden created by these measures and the real, tangible verification results that they should produce.

  • As we know, the ABM treaty now limits the number of deployed ABM launchers and ABM interceptor missiles for each side to 100, and our planned initial national missile defense system does not exceed these quantities.

  • It is relatively easy to observe permanent ground-based ABM launcher silos using national technical means of verification.

  • We, however, believe that steps to be taken on the basis of mutuality aimed at strengthening the observation of the number and location of each party's non-deployed ABM interceptor missiles could build the mutual confidence of the parties that the deployment of a limited NMD system will not reduce the other party's strategic deterrent potential.

  • Our approach is based on the following four fundamental elements:
    • information exchange with annual updating sufficient to give a comprehensive picture of key elements in the system (among other things, the number and location of ABM interceptor missiles, both deployed and non-deployed);
    • notification of key events, in preparation and past, pertaining to the ABM system to assist in observation of compliance with the provisions of the Protocol;
    • inspections to verify raw data and short-notice inspections to ensure safeguards of the accuracy attained within the bounds of the exchange of information and notifications to be provided by each Party; and
    • a mechanism for resolving matters of concern related to compliance, such as visits with special access rights within the bounds of the START. Using this mechanism, for example, one Party can request a visit to facilities inaccessible under other circumstances to verify the presence or absence of ABM interceptor missiles.

  • These measures are aimed at increasing the transparency and predictability of our respective actions related to the ABM Treaty, as well as confidence that any system intended to provide limited national defense will not jeopardize the strategic deterrent of the other Party.

  • By mutual agreement, the information exchanges, notifications and inspections specified in the Annex will not be required until the United States' first installation of an ABM interceptor at an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region.

  • As a result, the Russian Federation will not unilaterally bear the burden of providing the proposed notifications and verification measures.

  • Naturally, either Party may on a voluntary basis provide any information or notifications according to the provisions of Sections I and II of the Annex before the provision of such information or notification becomes mandatory.

  • The United States, for example, is prepared to consider the matter of providing certain information and notifications on a voluntary basis, if necessary, even before its first installation of an ABM interceptor in an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region.

  • Allow me to present the US proposal in each of these four areas in more detail as they are discussed in the proposed Annex on Verification.

    Information Exchange

  • The key provision on reporting in the Protocol we propose remains, of course, a quantitative maximum number of ABM launchers (just as in Articles III and IV of the 1972 ABM Treaty).

  • The US approach requires declaring the total number of ABM interceptor missiles transported from their respective final assembly facilities.

  • With respect to ABM deployment regions and other facilities subject to inspection, launch position diagrams are to be provided.

  • Demonstrations and information exchanges will be carried out with respect to all "types" of ABM interceptor missiles and ABM launchers.

    Notifications

  • The US approach to developing the control regime for the revised ABM Treaty calls for several notifications of measures in progress and completed.

  • Notifications will, for example, be provided on flight tests within the bounds of national missile defense, on the first installation of an ABM interceptor missile on an ABM launcher in the ABM system deployment region, on movement between facilities, dismantling or elimination, and construction of new ABM-related facilities.

    Inspections

  • The US approach includes certain types of onsite inspections, both to verify raw data and a quota for short-notice inspections to be performed to confirm the accuracy of the information provided on ABM interceptor and ABM launcher numbers and locations within the ABM system deployment region.

  • The US approach assumes that after the first US ABM interceptor missile is installed on an ABM launcher in the ABM system deployment region, there will be demonstrations of each type of ABM launcher and ABM interceptor missile.

  • Other steps to increase transparency will include voluntary demonstrations, observation, and visits using approved procedures.

  • If there arises a sufficiently serious, ambiguous situation or matter related to compliance with the Protocol, either side may decide within the bounds of the Annex to request that the mechanism that we took from the control regime under the START-I Treaty be used, i.e., visits with special access rights. Using this mechanism, one side can, for example, request a visit of the other side's facilities where in other cases it would be impossible to perform short-notice inspections, to verify whether non-deployed ABM interceptor missiles have been unlawfully deployed at those facilities.

  • We hope that you will carefully review these proposals and express your thoughts on this matter.


    RUSSIA'S CONCERNS

    The US national missile defense system will threaten Russia's strategic deterrent potential and thereby disrupt strategic stability.

    Response: The US national missile defense system, which will be limited and intended to defend against several dozen long-range missiles launched by rogue states, will be incapable of threatening Russia's strategic deterrent at the level of START-II or START-III (or later).

    For more than 30 years the classic argument in favor of strategic stability and against the deployment of a large-scale strategic missile defense system has been based on concerns that one side might have the ability to make a surprise disarming first strike against the enemy and then deploy a broad strategic missile defense system to knock out the enemy's combat resources which had survived the first strike and were being launched against the assailant. We have clearly stated that the US missile defense system to be developed by the US Government is a very limited strategic missile defense system intended to protect against a threat from some rogue state, which may, at most, use a few dozen warheads accompanied by advanced defense penetration aids. We also proposed steps to ensure Russia's confidence that the US system is in fact limited and deployed within the bounds of the agreed-upon terms of the amended ABM treaty. This classic argument is, therefore, simply inapplicable to defense, where capabilities are just as limited as they would have been in connection with proposals on the US NMD system. Nor could the system be upgraded to alter this reality, except over the long term, which would create conditions for considerable advance warning.

    First Strike Scenarios

  • Both the United States of America and the Russian Federation now possess and, as before, will possess under the terms of any possible future arms reduction agreements, large, diversified, viable arsenals of strategic offensive weapons consisting of various types of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Specifically, Russia's proposal for START-III would make it possible to have 1,500-2,000 warheads and even according to highly conservative hypotheses, Russia and the United States could deploy more than 1,000 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads over the next decade and thereafter.

  • These strategic offensive forces give each side the certain ability to carry out an annihilating counterattack on the other side regardless of the conditions under which the war began.

  • Forces of this size can easily penetrate a limited NMD system of the type that the United States is now developing.

  • Russia now keeps its strategic arsenal on constant alert and apparently will do so even at START-III levels. Russian forces under START-III could make an annihilating counterattack even under conditions of a surprise disarming first strike by the USA in combination with a limited US NMD system.

  • As a result of this Russian response initiated from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines at sea, land-based mobile missiles, silo-based ICBMs and bombers that would survive the first strike, a minimum of a few hundred warheads could be delivered. Moreover, Russian forces have sophisticated decoy systems and other defense penetration aids, and this means that it would not have to count on simply exhausting defensive resources to overcome them. Furthermore, the surviving Russian forces would be so large and sophisticated that they could carry out an assault to enhance the offensive, which no rogue state would be capable of.

  • Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that any enemy would ever contemplate a first strike, since it would have to assume that Russian ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles/nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in port would be launched after tactical warning, which would neutralize the effectiveness of the assault. In this case Russia's response to an assault would obviously be to send about a thousand warheads, together with two to three times more decoys, accompanied by other advanced defense penetration aids.

  • If an attempt at a disarming strike were made after a period of increased international tension or conflict using conventional weapons, Russia's counterattack would be considerable after the US repulsed the first strike as a result of explicit steps that the Russian armed forces would have taken to increase combat readiness by dispatching an additional number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines out to sea, by field deployment of a large number of mobile missiles and by putting bombers on takeoff alert.

  • The planned American strategic nuclear forces deployed under the START-III ceilings would also be able to be on constant alert or on crisis alert to deliver many hundreds of warheads in response to any assailant.

  • Both the United States and the Russian Federation therefore have solid capabilities to respond to a strike from any assailant with a large number of retaliatory weapons.

  • Furthermore, the tremendous risks associated with initiating a nuclear war under any circumstances make these theoretical calculations largely irrelevant. Obviously, neither side could ever contemplate such an assault.

    Limiting the Scale and Capabilities of the Proposed US National Missile Defense System

    Single Line of Defense

  • The Moscow ABM system and the US ABM system that was briefly deployed at Grand Forks have (or had) exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric interceptor missiles. By contrast, the NMD system that the USA is developing will be a single-layer system: exo-atmospheric interception of incoming warheads midway toward their targets.

  • In the long term, even a US NMD system with two deployment regions, as we are planning, would not permit the establishment of multi-layer defense. Moreover, a two-region system would enable us to maintain an effective single layer with exo-atmospheric capability to intercept several dozen single-warhead missiles accompanied by sophisticated defense penetration aids launched from North Korea or the Near East/Persian Gulf regions.

    Limited Number of Interceptor Missiles

  • The first phase of deployment will be limited to 100 interceptor missiles. Ultimately, when a second deployment position is added, there will be 200 or so interceptor missiles. This will be enough to knock out several dozen warheads accompanied by advanced defense penetration aids, but inadequate to counter a larger Russian counterstrike.

  • Deployment of a significant number of additional interceptor missiles and their silos would require major construction, which would take several years to complete, and this could easily be detected by national technical means of verification. In fact, our experience to date indicates that the speed with which the US could build interceptor missiles, not radars, is a key factor preventing rapid expansion. In any case, in view of the openness of budgetary processes in the US, this hypothetical increase in the number of interceptor missiles would be known several years before the expanded forces would first be deployed.

  • The USA has clearly stated its readiness to work with the Russians on transparency measures to increase confidence in both the nature and scope of the US NMD system, including production of interceptor missiles and in the fact that no rapid "breakout" will occur.

    Limited Number of Radars

  • The Clinton administration is now considering a US limited NMD system to counter missile threats by rogue states. It is intended to intercept long-range missiles launched from North Korea or from the Near East/Persian Gulf region midway toward the United States.

  • Consequently, advanced early warning radars, as well as ABM tracking radars associated with the proposed system should detect approaching warheads and track them in flight in space above the upper levels of the Northern Hemisphere, as shown on the attached diagrams.

  • As a result, the architecture of our US NMD requires that the existing early warning system radars around Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; Fylingdales, UK, Beale AFB in California; and Otis AFB in Massachusetts be upgraded to provide the necessary warning and tracking of missiles from rogue states.

  • These same radars could, of course, detect and track any long-range missiles headed toward the United States that might have been launched from any country in the Northern Hemisphere. It is the case that the system has to track the approach route for minimum-energy attack trajectories of ballistic missiles launched from North Korea and the Persian Gulf/Near East. This is not a sign of our intent to focus the US limited NMD system on possible attacks by Russia and China.

  • The existing five early warning radars, which we intend to upgrade, were developed and deployed for early warning purposes, and by design they are less capable than radars built specially to support missile defense system tasks.

  • In view of their technical characteristics (their operating frequency in particular), even after these radars are upgraded, they will not be able to provide sufficiently accurate information on tracking (distinguishing between warheads and defense penetration aids) to achieve effective defense against attack by more than a dozen warheads accompanied by the simplest defense penetration aids.

  • The initial level of defense we are striving for would have only one SHF** ABM radar deployed in Alaska. Even a US national missile defense system with a large number of SHF radars, which we would like to deploy in the long term, would not be able to deal with an arsenal of the size and sophistication that Russia would likely deploy under START-III.

    [** NOTE TO READER: SHF radars are often referred to as X-band radars. SHF stands for "super high frequency" and is the frequency band 3 to 30 gigahertz. This includes the X-band (8-12 gigahertz).]

    Penetrating the US NMD System

  • The number and level of sophistication of Russian warheads and defense penetration aids will ensure that the US NMD will not have significant capabilities against Russia's nuclear deterrent.

  • In accordance with START-3 levels proposed for the USA and Russia, Russian ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles clearly would carry more than 1,000 warheads accompanied by twice that many decoys and defense penetration aids. Authoritative written Russian sources claim that the Russian Government understands that the capabilities of its defense penetration aids are extremely high. These same written sources, supplemented by the statements of senior Russian military personnel and defense industry representatives, clearly present the idea that the Russian Government anticipates that its defense penetration aids could easily overcome the US NMD system.

  • The limited NMD system that the USA is developing relies on hit-to-kill technology, in which the interceptor missile destroys the warhead on impact with it.

  • This approach clearly differs from the use of the interceptor missiles with nuclear warheads in the Russian system deployed around Moscow, which could destroy several warheads with one interceptor missile.

  • In the American hit-to-kill system at least one interceptor missile has to be launched against each warhead and "authentic object." By this we mean a decoy or its likeness, which are frequently accompanied by aids to overcome defense (active and passive jamming, etc.) which cannot be distinguished from warheads. To achieve high certainty that no warhead is overcoming the defense system, one has to launch a multitude of interceptor missiles against each warhead or authentic decoy combined with additional defense penetration aids.

  • In view of the operational realities of the defense of a large area, a limited strategic missile defense system consisting of 100 non-nuclear interceptor missiles will be able in the best case to destroy 20-25 warheads on impact with comparatively primitive defense penetration aids. Two hundred interceptor missiles could destroy 40-50 warheads. We do not think that reducing Russia's ability to counterattack by 20-50 warheads would substantially affect Russia's strategic deterrent, even at START-III levels.

  • In an encounter with a retaliatory attack from Russia, which would include sophisticated defense penetration aids, a limited North American missile defense system could destroy far fewer warheads.

  • Furthermore, the system as developed is not equipped to defend against submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which might be launched from a large number of deployment sites. Quite to the contrary, it was developed to defend against an ICBM attack from a comparatively narrow direction from specific rogue states.

    The bottom line is clear: the strategic missile defense system for the limited US NMD system which we are calling for could protect only against a few dozen ICBM warheads accompanied by sophisticated defense penetration aids.


    RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL MONITORING SYSTEM AND EXPANSION OF COOPERATION IN OTHER AREAS TO TRACK MISSILE AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION

  • Russia has expressed great interest in studying the missile defense issues we have discussed in the context of a broader approach to nonproliferation.

  • We can reach agreement. Our own strategy with regard to nonproliferation of missile technologies includes three elements: first, we are trying to prevent the danger from arising, although if it does, we want to be ready to deter it or, if this is impossible, to be ready to protect ourselves against it. We think that each of these elements complements the others.

  • You should not mistakenly interpret the limited national missile defense system that we are developing as evidence that we have given up trying to prevent the proliferation of missile technologies or are unable to counter it. Despite all our efforts, however, we cannot expect that steps to prevent or counter it will be successful in all cases.

  • At this group's last meeting in October, I made a detailed presentation on global nonproliferation issues in which I covered a wide range of issues, including export control, Y2K, exchange of early warning information on missile launches and pre-launch notification, the Perry mission to North Korea and Iran.

  • A significant part of my presentation focused on areas in which we are already working together.

  • Joint efforts to adapt the ABM Treaty must be a part of this overall nonproliferation strategy, since it is a direct result of the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

  • In the past month in Moscow, Mr. Mamedov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs gave Defense Minister Talbot [sic] two documents on a Global Monitoring System and a third document entitled "On Agreed Russian and American Approaches to Expanding Cooperation in Countering Worldwide Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology."

  • These documents enabled us to raise the discussion of these issues to another level.

  • We are ready to present our preliminary thoughts on your proposal on the Global Monitoring System (GMS) and seek further clarifications. In addition, we will offer our amendments to your draft document on a coordinated Russian-American approach to countering the worldwide proliferation of missiles and missile technology.

  • Allow me to make a few general comments on your draft document and the concept of GMS.

    Global Monitoring System

  • Allow me first to dwell on the GMS, which is the main point of your cooperation proposals. The GMS proposal apparently has four basic elements:

  • The first is global monitoring of missile launches, which encompasses notification, exchange of early warning information, and the establishment of an international center, is a continuation of our joint effort on the initiative on missile launch information exchange put forth by our Presidents in September 1998.

  • Wide access to information contained in launch notifications and universal launch monitoring would be an important tool in building trust.

  • We agree that the principle of broad international participation is important to the success of launch notifications, and we can support the voluntary participation of any state provided that this participation does not legitimize the missile programs of rogue states.

  • Broad international participation in early warning or early detection information exchange or the establishment of an international monitoring center for this purpose will go beyond the framework of our concept in this area, but we are ready to study this idea in the future.

  • It is important that we gradually move toward bilateral agreements and understandings before we expand our efforts to involve others.

  • We are completely convinced that the first step in establishing any international system should be the signing of the agreements on exchanging missile launch information and notification of planned launches which we have been working on together. We hope that these discussions can be renewed in early February.

  • As soon as we reach an understanding on the agreement on notification of scheduled launches, we will be ready to discuss a diplomatic strategy to achieve broad international participation in this effort.

  • Previously we also informed you that we are ready to discuss the possibility of including, where necessary and reasonable, individual members of the "Big Eight" in the Joint Warning Center as a first step in carrying out President Yeltsin's initiative set forth at the Big Eight meeting in Cologne.

  • We have many questions about the second proposed element of the GMS, namely guarantees of the security of any state participating in the GMS.

  • Safeguarding the security of states that halt their missile programs is unfeasible.

  • We must, however, better understand what Russia thinks about this before further continuing discussion of this element.

  • The third element of the GMS pertains to incentives, including aid to national space programs for states that turn away from possessing missile systems.

  • We agree that in certain cases incentives can play an important role as part of an overall approach to a specific country in countering missile technology proliferation.

  • In our approaches to North Korea with regard to both issues of the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies, we have found that positive incentives can be effective, at least in deterring proliferation activities.

  • One-size-fits-all approaches to incentives would, however, be counterproductive in countering missile technology proliferation, and it is not clear that this can be done on a multilateral basis (in contrast to a bilateral basis)--we would welcome your assessments.

  • We are especially concerned about offering aid within the framework of national space programs. It is difficult to "aid" space efforts, especially a space launch, without promoting the proliferation of missile technologies. These technologies overlap much more than do technologies for the development of nuclear reactors for peaceful civilian use and those for a nuclear weapons development program.

  • While we are not ready to provide aid to national programs for the development of booster rockets, other space-related incentives might be considered, such as providing rocket-launching services at favorable prices for key countries. This might be an appropriate topic for discussion at a Big Eight meeting.

  • And finally, as regards the consultation mechanism, we are in favor of holding regular consultations among countries involved in this matter. We do not believe that broad multilateral discussions will be productive at this time. These issues should be discussed within the framework of the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] (and groups of MTCR partners) before they are moved outside this framework.

  • Discussions within the framework of MTCR partners, the Big Eight, and Russian-American bilateral discussions are possible ways to study these ideas in depth. We would not want GMS proposals to diminish the effectiveness of existing forums.

    Other Proposals on Cooperation

  • Your additional proposals on cooperation were based on ideas that the USA put forth at our discussions of the ABM Treaty, for example, exchanging information on missile system proliferation, joint actions toward computer modeling and renewing and continuing our TMD [theater missile defense] testing programs.

  • We welcome your interest in these areas of possible cooperation that we proposed during our discussion of the ABM Treaty. We will be ready to study your ideas in detail in future meetings.

  • It is not clear from Russia's statement whether you are proposing that additional aspects of cooperation will be effected on a bilateral basis or with multilateral involvement.

  • From our side, we would like to study whether multilateral participation is logical in each individual case. We previously stated our desire to discuss with Russia the possibility of including individual Big Eight countries in the TMD testing program as a first step in implementing the initiative put forth by President Yeltsin in Cologne.

  • There is one Russian proposal pertaining to additional cooperation that raises some concern, namely the proposal to carry out confidence-building measures agreed to in the context of demarcation agreements on ABMs and theater ABMs on a bilateral basis. We do not believe that this will be proper.

    Approach to Cooperation

  • We fully concur with point 5 of your draft statement that cooperation in countering missile and missile technology proliferation "should be long term and established in phases."

  • In general we believe that we should build a firm foundation for cooperation, first on a bilateral basis and later by involving Big Eight states and other states participating in the MTCR as necessary.

  • We are convinced that steps toward starting negotiations on an international agreement on GMS at a meeting in Moscow at the beginning of this year, as you suggest, will be premature.

  • This meeting is not only premature because of the many bilateral issues requiring our analysis, but also because both our sides agreed at the plenary meeting on the MTCR in Noordwijk in October of last year to continue discussion of approaches to the global threat of missile technology proliferation at a special meeting of MTCR partners in Paris in March.

  • To be honest, we were disappointed by the fact that Russia has moved away from the understanding on MTCR and invited non-partners to the conference it has proposed.

    Conclusion

  • We welcome the study of new ideas on countering missile technology proliferation that will not disrupt current efforts.

  • A joint approach by the USA and the Russian Federation could make any nonproliferation efforts much more effective.

  • We also welcome your initiative in developing a statement on a coordinated US-Russian approach to this problem.

  • We are ready to work on this statement and determine if it is possible to find a basis for a coordinated approach.

  • A Russian response to our revised draft statement could be the next step.


    UNILATERAL STATEMENT

  • The draft Protocol introduces into the ABM Treaty only those amendments that are necessary to deploy phase 1 of the defensive system against ballistic missile attack.

  • If the threat created by ballistic missiles in countries such as North Korea and Iran will grow, as we think it will, it will be necessary to deploy more anti-missile missiles, more radars and another deployment region later.

  • The USA's unilateral statement expresses the US opinion that the evolution of the threat may require further deployment of defensive systems that will be more effective than those allowed by the Protocol.

  • This defensive system will nevertheless be limited and will require negotiations under future protocols.

  • If the threat will grow, as we think it will, we will exercise our right, in accordance with the Protocol, to request further negotiations to draft further amendments to the Treaty to protect against more serious and sophisticated threats from North Korea and the Near East.

  • The danger posed by states threatening international peace and stability is spreading to other countries besides the USA and Russia. The response to this threat may require international cooperation.

  • New negotiations may thus include a reconsideration of Article IX and Agreed Statement G involving international cooperation outside the bounds of that permitted by the Treaty.

  • The unilateral statement expresses the viewpoint of the United States. At present we are not seeking Russian agreement, but are explaining, as a part of the protocol record of these negotiations, that we foresee a continuation of negotiations on more effective systems to counter the threat if, as we assume, it will increase.


    PROTOCOL
    TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
    THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
    AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
    1

    ____________________, the Parties to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, signed May 26, 1972, with amendments introduced by the Protocol of July 3, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

    Recognizing the importance of the Treaty for strategic stability,

    Noting the commitment of the Parties to the Treaty to consider proposals to increase the viability of the Treaty as necessary,

    Considering changes in the strategic situation that have occurred as a result of the proliferation among states of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles which threaten international peace and security,

    Recognizing the necessity of protecting their citizens and, consequently, their territories from the threat that these states will use long-range ballistic missiles and recognizing that this threat is increasing and that the defensive capabilities necessary to protect against this threat must also increase, from which it follows that the Treaty must be updated as necessary to permit the creation of the necessary defense,

    Intending to adapt the Treaty to these changes in the strategic situation,

    Proceeding from the understanding that the deployment of ABM systems for limited defense of their respective national territories will neither threaten nor allow a threat to the strategic deterrent forces of either Party,

    Undertaking to carry out this deployment on the basis of cooperation and transparency, and

    Reaffirming their commitment to continue consultations aimed at strengthening and improving the efficacy of the Treaty,

    Have agreed as follows:

    Article I

    The United States of America and the Russian Federation shall be permitted to deploy a missile defense system for purposes of limited defense of their national territory against limited long-range ballistic missile strikes as an alternative to deploying the ABM systems permitted by Articles I and III of the Treaty.

    Article II

    The limited territorial missile defense system permitted by Article I hereof shall be subject to the following provisions:

    a) With regard to the provisions of Article I of the Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation may each deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 antimissile missiles at launching positions within one deployment region within their national territory. The radius of this limited territorial defense deployment region may not exceed 150 km;

    b) With regard to the provisions of Article VI, subparagraph a and Article IX of the Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation shall be permitted to enable strategic ballistic missile attack warning radars in existence on December 1, 1999 to perform ABM radar functions to support the limited territorial missile defense system deployed in accordance herewith;

    c) The United States and the Russian Federation may deploy one additional ABM radar each at any site within their national territory.

    Article III

    If the United States or the Russian Federation decides to deploy a limited territorial missile defense system pursuant to the provisions hereof as an alternative to deploying the missile defense permitted by Articles I and III of the Treaty,

    a) ABM launchers deployed in accordance with Article III of the Treaty that are not operational, under construction or undergoing testing, overhaul, repair, or refurbishment on December 1, 1999 will not have to be dismantled or destroyed. These launchers shall not be counted in the number provided for by Article II, subparagraph a hereof;

    b) ABM launchers deployed pursuant to Article III of the Treaty that are operational, under construction or undergoing testing, major overhaul, repair, or refurbishment as of December 1, 1999 shall be dismantled or destroyed so that there shall be no more than 100 ABM launchers deployed at any time;

    c) ABM radars deployed pursuant to Article III of the Treaty on December 1, 1999 will not have to be dismantled or destroyed.

    Article IV

    To increase confidence in compliance and ensure compliance with the Treaty and with this Protocol, the Parties shall carry out the provisions of the Annex, which shall be an integral part hereof.

    Article V

    Except for changes specified hereby, all existing rights and duties of the Parties to the Treaty shall remain in force and shall be applicable to the limited national defense system.

    Article VI

    At the request of one of the Parties, but no sooner than March 1, 2001, the Parties shall commence good faith negotiations to review this Protocol to take into account further changes in the strategic situation caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles which therefore might require deployment of more effective limited national territorial defense systems necessary to counter these long-range missiles.

    Article VII

    This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and shall enter into force on the day of exchange of the Protocol ratification instruments.


    ANNEX
    TO THE PROTOCOL
    TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
    THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
    AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

    In accordance with the provisions of the Protocol to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems signed _____________________, 2000, hereinafter Protocol, the Parties hereby agree on the following steps to build confidence in compliance and ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, hereinafter Treaty, and of the Protocol.

    Section I.

    1. In accordance herewith, the Parties shall carry out an initial exchange of information and notifications no later than 90 days after the Protocol enters into force. This exchange shall reflect data on the effective date of the Protocol. Unless otherwise agreed, this information shall be updated annually on January 1 of each year and shall be provided no later than April 1 of that year. The annual update of information shall not be required to report data that remained unchanged since the previous information exchange. This information exchange shall not be required until the first installation by the United States of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within an ABM system deployment region.

    2. Each Party shall submit the following information on its missile defense system2:

    a) anti-missile missiles;

    i) designation/name; type of warhead (nuclear; high-explosive fragmentation, neutron); the number of stages; the length and maximum diameter of the anti-missile missile3, which by its configuration is intended both for installation on an ABM launcher and for storage; the type of fuel (solid or liquid); the length and maximum diameter of the anti-missile missile outside its launch container;

    ii) the number and location, with regard to each facility, of the deployed anti-missile missiles (i.e., anti-missile missiles installed on ABM launchers within an ABM system deployment region) and non-deployed anti-missile missiles;

    iii) photographs of each type of anti-missile missile that, by its configuration, is intended both for installation on an ABM launcher and for storage; each type of anti-missile missile outside its launch container; a silo loader indicated in paragraph 2, subparagraph d of this section;

    b) ABM launchers:

    i) designation/name; diameter;

    ii) number and geographic coordinates of deployed ABM launchers;

    c) ABM radars:

    i) designation/name; frequency range (using designations accepted by the International Electrical Communications Union);

    ii) the number and geographic coordinates of each ABM radar;

    d) the number of silo loaders in the ABM deployment region and intended for installing anti-missile missiles in ABM launchers;

    e) the general concept of the operation of the Party's missile defense system (in a form of the Party's choice);

    f) the status of the Party's plans and programs with respect to its missile defense system (in a form of the Party's choice).

    3. Each Party shall provide the following information with respect to ABM Test Ranges for testing its missile defense system;

    a) the name and geographic coordinates of all such ABM test ranges;

    b) the number and geographic coordinates of ABM launchers, ABM radars, anti-missile missile maintenance facilities and anti-missile missile storage facilities in the ABM test range.

    4. Each Party shall report the name and geographic coordinates of each strategic ballistic missile attack warning radar.

    5. Each Party shall provide the following information on the following facilities located outside its ABM system deployment area:

    a) the name and geographic coordinates of all final assembly sites for anti-missile missiles, anti-missile missile maintenance facilities, and anti-missile missile storage facilities;

    b) with respect to each facility subject to inspection in accordance with Section III herein, a diagram of the facility shall be provided to the other Parties in accordance with paragraph 1 herein or no later than 30 days after initial notification of a facility at which non-deployed anti-missile missiles are located in accordance with Section II, paragraph 7 hereof.

    6. Each Party shall provide the following information on the region where its own ABM will be located:

    a) a diagram of the entire deployment region showing the location of each ABM launcher, each anti-missile missile maintenance facility, and each anti-missile missile storage facility;

    b) with respect to an ABM deployment region established after the Protocol enters into force, the Party shall provide a diagram of that region no later than 30 days prior to the installation of the first anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region. This diagram shall show the actual or planned location of each ABM launcher, each anti-missile missile maintenance facility, and each anti-missile missile storage facility.

    Section II

    In accordance with Section I, paragraph 1 of this Annex, each Party shall provide the following notifications of its ABM system. These notifications shall be provided within the bounds of the initial exchange of information and notifications. In the future these notifications will be provided in accordance with the provisions of this Section II. The provision of these notifications is not required before the United States has installed an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region.

    1. Notifications provided under the initial information exchange as specified in Section I, paragraph 1 or no later than within 90 days of the date of commencement of:

    a) any construction or assembly work which is not earthmoving (soil excavation) associated with the construction of anti-missile missiles; or

    b) any construction or assembly work associated with the construction of antennae (arrays), structures associated with an ABM radar antenna or antenna pedestal supports that are not parts of buildings pertaining to ABM radars.

    2. Notifications to be provided within no less than 90 days of the first installation of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region.

    3. Notifications to be provided within no less than 10 days of the launch of an anti-missile missile. These notifications shall indicate the designation/name of the anti-missile missile and the geographic coordinates of the anti-missile missile launch site.

    4. Notifications to be provided within no less than _____ days, of the maiden launch of each new type (to be defined by the Party providing the notification) of anti-missile missile.

    5. Notifications to be provided no later than 48 hours after completion thereof, of the transit of an anti-missile missile between the ABM system deployment region, anti-missile missile maintenance facilities which are not within the ABM system deployment region, anti-missile missile storage facilities which are not within the ABM system deployment region, and anti-missile missile final assembly facilities.

    6. Notifications to be provided no later than 5 days after completion thereof, of the dismantling or elimination of an anti-missile missile (including elimination as the result of an accident or elimination by launch).

    7. Notifications of a facility not previously indicated in accordance with Section I, paragraph 5, subparagraph a and paragraph 6, subparagraph a to be provided no less than 30 days before the first arrival of an anti-missile missile at that facility.

    Section III

    1. Each Party shall have the right to perform the following inspection activity in accordance with procedures subject to the approval of the Parties. This inspection activity shall not be performed prior to the initial installation by the United States of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region:

    a) commencing 30 days after the date of the initial installation of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region, but no less than 90 days after an agreement is reached on the specific procedures for performing this inspection, each Party shall have the right to perform inspections with respect to raw data to confirm the accuracy of the information submitted on the number and location of non-deployed anti-missile missiles and ABM launchers. These inspections shall be performed in the ABM system deployment region, including at anti-missile missile maintenance facilities and at anti-missile missile storage facilities within this ABM system deployment region;

    b) commencing 60 days after the date of the initial installation of an anti-missile missile on an ABM launcher within the ABM system deployment region, but no less than 90 days after an agreement is reached on the specific procedures for performing this inspection, each Party shall have the right to perform a total of _____ short-notice site inspections in each treaty year to confirm the accuracy of the information provided on the numbers and locations of non-deployed anti-missile missiles and ABM launchers. These inspections shall be performed in the ABM system deployment region, including at anti-missile missile maintenance facilities and anti-missile missile storage facilities at the same locations.

    2. If either Party has a concern with respect to compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, that Party may express this concern under the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission and request that specific measures be taken to alleviate this concern. These measures may include, but not be limited to, a visit with special right of access to a facility or place where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that raised the concern occurred. The receiving Party shall provide a response no later than 7 days after receipt of such request. The receiving Party's response shall include:

    a) consent or refusal to take the proposed specific measure to alleviate the concern, including, if a visit with special access right is proposed, the date, place, and procedure for such visit; or

    b) a proposal on a specific alternative measure to alleviate the concern, including, if a visit with special access right is proposed, the date, place, and procedures for such visit.

    3. Each Party shall, in accordance with procedures subject to an agreement between the Parties, give demonstrations of each type (as defined by the Party giving the demonstration) of anti-missile missile and ABM launcher to be used in its ABM system. The goal of these demonstrations is to provide the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of dimensional information contained in the notifications to be provided in accordance with the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2, subparagraph a and of paragraph 2, subparagraph b of this Annex:

    a) with regard to anti-missile missiles and ABM launchers included in the initial exchange of information and notifications in accordance with Section I, paragraph 1 of this Annex, the time of these demonstrations shall be subject to agreement by the Parties;

    b) with regard to anti-missile missiles and ABM launchers not included in the initial exchange of information and notifications in accordance with Section I, paragraph 1 of this Annex, these demonstrations shall be given within a 30-day period commencing:

    i) with respect to anti-missile missiles, at a time and place subject to agreement by the Parties;

    ii) with respect to ABM launchers, on the date of the initial installation of an anti-missile missile in such ABM launcher; [sic]

    5. [sic] For the efficient performance of their functions in fulfillment of the provisions of this Annex, but not in their personal interest, inspectors shall be granted the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents in accordance with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

    Section IV

    1. Either Party may, on a voluntary basis, organize for the other Party a demonstration of its system or the components thereof or other activities pertaining to missile defense; an observation of the launchings of its anti-missile missiles; or a visit to facilities related to missile defense and the area where its missile defense system is located. In each specific case, the participating Parties shall agree in advance on the goal of these demonstrations, observations and visits and on the steps to accomplish them.

    2. Each Party may, on a voluntary basis, provide any other information or any other notifications not mentioned in the other provisions of this Annex. In addition, either Party may, on a voluntary basis, provide information in accordance with Sections I and II hereof before this information is required to be provided. This information and these notifications shall be provided on the matters, to the extent, and within the timeframes that each Party itself shall determine.

    Section V

    1. Each Party shall use the channels of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or equivalent intergovernmental communications channels to provide and receive notifications and to exchange information in accordance with the provisions of this Annex.

    2. Each Party undertakes not to disclose information provided in accordance herewith except with the express consent of the Party that provided that information.

    Section VI

    Upon the entry into force of the Protocol, the Parties undertake to propose and agree upon, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, additional administrative and technical procedures that may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Annex. These administrative and technical procedures shall be devised as quickly as possible.


    NOTES:

    1 The Russian document is the translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the original English document.

    2 The term "missile defense system" and its components: "anti-missile missile (anti-missile missiles)," "ABM launcher (ABM launchers)," and "ABM radar" shall be used both with respect to ABM systems used to defend a region, as permitted by Articles I and III and with respect to the Party's limited national missile defense systems.

    3 Exclusively for the purposes hereof and unless indicated otherwise, an anti-missile missile shall be defined as follows: an anti-missile missile assembly with all its stages, all adapters between stages and warheads in its launch container.

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